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Abstract 
 
While clientelism is most often viewed as a symptom of traditional politics, empirical evidence 
suggests that it is actually a varied and multifaceted phenomenon, found in widely differing 
economic, political, and cultural contexts. As a result, our understanding of how formal 
institutions affect clientelism remains limited. This article integrates research on clientelism and 
electoral integrity, arguing that as the capacity of electoral management bodies (EMBs) increases, 
the costs of clientelism increase for voters, parties, and candidates. As a result of this increasing 
cost, we anticipate that declines in the supply of clientelism are associated with advances in EMB 
capacity, all else equal. This theory is tested using V-Dem data, covering more than 160 countries 
from 1900 to 2016, as well as several alternative measures of both EMB capacity and clientelism 
as vote buying. This multifaceted empirical approach finds strong support for the theory that 
EMB capacity decreases the supply of clientelism at the country-level.  
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Institutions of electoral integrity and clientelism: The role of 
electoral management bodies 
 
 
Clientelism – the non-programmatic, conditional distribution of resources in return for political 
support (Stokes et al. 2013) – is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be found in large parts of 
the developing and developed world, and whose networks, operations, and outreach differ 
substantially between countries and over time (Hicken 2011; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Berenschot 
and Aspinall 2020). As clientelism impedes economic development, democracy, and good 
governance (e.g. Chubb 1982; Hicken 2011; Stokes 2011), many regard its reduction as an 
important development goal (Stokes et al. 2013; Berenschot and Aspinall 2020). Yet, past 
academic research explaining differences in levels of clientelism focus heavily on the effects of 
modernization (e.g. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). In other words, clientelism 
is thought to be both a cause and outcome of economic development. As a consequence, our 
knowledge about how formal institutions affect clientelism remains limited. Understanding this 
could provide insights into more tangible interventions that mitigate against clientelism in the 
short-run.  
To that end, this article integrates research on clientelism with a growing body of work on 
electoral integrity (e.g. Norris 2015; James et al. 2019) to assess the relationship between electoral 
management and clientelism. More specifically, we theorize that improving the capacity of 
electoral management bodies (EMB) will deter clientelism by decreasing its utility for voters, 
parties, and candidates. By increasing the legitimacy of elections, EMB capacity increases the 
costs of clientelistic exchanges. Voters increase the price for their votes; thereby encouraging 
parties and candidates to pursue other strategies to capture support, like programmatic goods. 
Enhancing EMB capacity also increases the costs of clientelism for parties and candidates by 
impeding the monitoring capacity of their brokers, e.g. by ensuring ballot secrecy and limiting 
access to polling stations.  
We assess the relationship between electoral management and the supply of clientelism 
within countries over time. The main tests draw on data collected by the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) Project using a sample of more than 160 countries from 1900–2016. The empirical 
investigation also includes several alternative measures of EMB capacity and clientelism to 
account for risks of measurement bias. Because endogeneity is prevalent with two such 
proximate phenomena, this article employs three strategies: one- and five-year lags of the 
independent variable, an instrumental variable model, and a model treating endogeneity as 
omitted variable bias, namely corruption. This multifaceted assessment of the country-level 
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relationship supports the theory that EMB capacity decreases the supply of clientelism. 
However, the robustness checks suggest that only certain elements of EMB capacity and 
clientelism could be related, paving the way for future research into more specific institutional 
and behavioral causal mechanisms.  
The findings hold several implications for research on clientelism and electoral integrity. 
We demonstrate the importance of analyzing formal institutions and their performance when 
addressing clientelism, from both an academic and practice perspective. Moreover, we provide 
evidence that the effects of EMB capacity resonate beyond formal democratic procedures, 
altering the incentives and behavior of various political actors. Thus, our findings link to the 
broader question on the relationship between democracy and good governance, showing how 
the improvement of a democratic institution can deter a practice that undermines impartiality 
and administrative efficiency. Finally, while the existing literature focuses on a set of dynamic, 
longer term effects stemming from economic development, this article offers an analysis of a 
more direct and practical method of deterring clientelism. Improving the capacity of electoral 
management bodies, while not a simple task, is a clear goal, and furthermore one that the 
development community already has thorough experience working toward (e.g. Catt et al. 2014; 
Norris 2015; Karp et al. 2017). 
Clientelism – many varieties, few detriments 
Clientelism is defined as a non-programmatic, conditional distribution of resources like jobs, 
goods, services, and money, that are given in exchange for political support (Stokes et al. 2013). 
In other words, it is a targeted, partial distribution contingent on reciprocating political support 
that is neither formalized nor public. This typically operates through a pyramidical network of 
brokers charged with persuading or threatening voters with resources (Stokes 2005; Nichter 
2008; Stokes et al. 2013). Brokers thus play an important role in clientelistic exchanges, but also 
present several inefficiencies for parties, such as embezzlement, moral hazard, and insufficient 
monitoring capacity (Stokes et al. 2013; Aspinall 2014; Denissen 2020). There is also widespread 
agreement that pervasive clientelism leads to democratic, institutional, and distributary 
deficiencies that play a part in keeping countries unequal, corrupt, and poor (Chubb 1982; 
Shefter 1994; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Hicken 2011; Fukuyama 2013; Stokes et al. 2013).  
Aside from these commonalities, however, clientelism is often characterized as 
multifaceted and heterogenous, as is shown by the extensive case study literature covering most 
world regions and time periods (e.g. Chubb 1982; Shefter 1994; Weghorst and Lindberg 2011, 
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2013; Stokes et al. 2013; Aspinall and Hicken 2020; Denissen 2020; Veenendal and Corbet 2020; 
Weiss 2020). For example, some scholars contend that clientelism necessarily requires an 
exchange between two individuals sharing a close relationship (dyarchy) that is asymmetrical in 
terms of power and status (hierarchy) and sustained over repeated exchanges (iteration).  In the 
recent decade, however, studies suggest that clientelism varies in relation to these three 
components (e.g. Nichter 2011; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Berenschott and Aspinall 2020; Yıldırım 
and Kitschelt 2020). Some clientelism, often termed “relational”, is more iterated, dyadic, and 
hierarchic, a typical case being a civil service job being given in exchange for political support. By 
contrast, “electoral” clientelism frequently entails a “single-shot” of vote-buying at election time, 
often without any elements of dyarchy or iteration between broker and voter.  
This heterogeneity could be a consequence of limited comparative data and divergent case 
contexts. In response, several scholars have developed frameworks describing the “varieties of 
clientelism” (e.g. Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Mares and Young 2016; Berenschot and Aspinall 2020) 
based on contextual factors that incentivize some forms of clientelism over others and actors’ 
strategies that determine the more precise set of exchanges within those contextual boundaries.  
Several contextual factors may shape the choice of clientelistic strategies. For example, in 
African countries, democratization shifts clientelism from personalized elite-centered exchanges 
toward mass-based practices (Van de Walle 2007). Elsewhere, evidence shows that vote-buying 
increases in young electoral regimes (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015a) and that clientelistic broker 
mediation differs between democracies and autocracies (Denissen 2020). Furthermore, 
demographic factors like population size (Veenendal and Corbet 2020) and ethnic identities 
(Posner 2005; Isaksson and Bigsten 2017) shape the type of clientelistic networks and targets of 
inducements. In addition, economic development (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 
2013), degree of competition (Chubb 1982; Magaloni et al. 2007; Medina and Stokes 2007; 
Driscoll 2018; Yıldırım 2020), and institutions and institutional junctures (Fukuyama 2013; 
Aspinall and Hicken 2020; Driscoll 2020), are all likely to affect the type of clientelistic 
operations observed within a given case.  
Operating within these contexts, actors may choose from a menu of clientelism strategies 
based on their perceived costs and viability for success (Mares and Young 2016). For example, in 
electoral clientelism, parties can opt for varying combinations of vote buying, turnout buying, 
abstention buying, and combined persuasions (Nichter 2008; Gans-Morse et al. 2014). For 
relational clientelism, there are several types of inducements available, such as handing out 
employment, contracts, and long-term provision of some service (e.g. Chubb 1982; Shefter 1994; 
Robinson and Verdier 2013). Game theoretical models on clientelism highlight that different 
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groups of voters generally demand different resources and monitoring (Dixit and Londregan 
1996; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; Stokes et al. 2013), further 
contributing to parties choosing a different portfolio of clientelistic practices depending on 
circumstances.  Consequently, the degree, type, and particular operations of clientelism in a given 
country and time period are the product of a number of contextual factors and actors’ choices 
that can result in widely differing clientelistic systems. 
The variation and complexity of modern-day clientelism suggest that several variables 
could explain its observed supply within a given context. Yet, to date, our knowledge about the 
origins and extent of clientelism remains dominated by modernization theory (Calvo and Murillo 
2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2011; Hicken 2011; Robinson and Verdier 2013; 
Stokes et al. 2013). This theory generally relies on three propositions: First, increased income 
levels make support costlier to buy, thus decreasing parties’ and candidates’ propensity to supply 
clientelistic goods (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Hicken 2011; Stokes et al. 2013). Second, 
increased income levels shift voters’ preferences toward new types of benefits, generally those 
linked to public goods and further development of the national economy, thus decreasing voter 
demand for clientelism (Hicken 2011). Finally, economic development causes urbanization, 
which obstructs brokers capacity to keep small, stable networks of clients (Stokes et al. 2013).  
Consequently, poverty reduction, a growth in the middle class, and greater urbanization – factors 
frequently tied to economic development and modernization – are seen as the central 
impediments to clientelistic practices.   
This characterization of clientelism as a pre-modern practice that will fade with economic 
development remains at odds with the rich case-based evidence showing clientelism to be a 
persistent phenomenon, adaptable to changing circumstances within widely differing economic, 
political, and cultural contexts (Hicken 2011; Berenschot and Aspinall 2020). As such, several 
recent studies explore how clientelism relates to other factors. For example, evidence from 
Ghana shows that clientelistic practices decrease over the experience of iterated elections 
(Lindberg 2010, 2013; Weghorst and Lindberg 2011, 2013), as women’s participation increases, 
and due to democratic education campaigns (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). Parties and 
politicians may also decrease their clientelistic exchanges as their capacity for credible 
commitment increases, which is shown to be related the age of democracy (Keefer 2007; Keefer 
and Vlaicu 2008)2 and voter trust in bureaucracies (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017). 
Other studies link clientelism to the viability of  programmatic campaigns (Keefer 2007; 
                                                 
2 Kitschelt and Kselman (2013) find that age of democracy may moderate the effects of economic development; 
although, this study argues that economic development and linkage to the international economy are more 
important predictors than regime type. 
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Robinson and Verdier 2013; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; Van Ham and Lindberg 2015a; 
Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017), degree of party system competition (Magaloni et al. 
2007; Medina and Stokes 2007; Driscoll 2018; Yıldırım 2020), level of ethnic fractionalization 
(Easterly and Levine 1997; Posner 2005; Chandra 2007; Baldwin and Huber 2010), and 
dysfunctional institutions and governance (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010; 2012; Rothstein 2011; 
2018; Fukuyama 2013). These findings suggest that economic development is unlikely to be the 
only avenue through which clientelism decreases. They call for a more concerted effort to 
theorize about how formal institutions and other aspects of the political context generally affect 
the supply of (and demand for) clientelism.  
Electoral management’s impact on actors’ political strategies 
Formal institutions are widely regarded to shape political outcomes by setting constraints 
and incentives for involved actors (Dahl 1971; North 1991; Miller and Hammond 1994; Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004). In particular, electoral systems, rules, and procedures often affect political 
behavior (e.g. Norris 2004; 2009; Schedler 2009a, b; Lindberg 2009a, b; Brownlee 2009; Lijphart 
2012; Edgell et al. 2018). These institutions are especially likely to alter actors’ preferences for 
clientelism because a substantial amount of clientelistic exchanges occur during and with the 
motive of winning elections. Focusing on one aspect of this and drawing on the growing 
literature on electoral integrity, this article explores the role of electoral management in 
clientelism.  
Electoral management is often an important determinant of electoral integrity, 
democratization, and democratic resilience (Mozaffar 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Elklit 
and Reynolds 2002; 2005; Norris 2015, 2019; James et al. 2019; van Ham and Garnett 2019; 
Garnett 2019). National elections constitute a massive mobilization of people, which produces a 
complex logistical exercise that includes enforcing electoral and campaign rules, setting up and 
staffing polling stations, administering ballots, establishing and updating voter rolls, counting the 
votes, and distributing information on when, where, and how to vote (Mozaffar 2002; Mozaffar 
and Schedler 2002; Elklit and Reynolds 2002; 2005; Norris 2015; James et al. 2019). There are 
numerous examples in both developed and developing countries where the electoral 
management has failed to meet these demands, among the most famous being the chaotic events 
in Florida in the 2000 U.S. presidential election (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). The recent Iowa 
caucus for the 2020 U.S. Democratic Party presidential primary also aptly illustrates the 
consequences of poor electoral management, where the technical system to tally the votes broke 
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down, causing much delay, confusion, and distrust (Cohn et al. 2020; McNamara 2020; Seitz and 
Klepper 2020).  
As a result, electoral integrity relies on a capable electoral management body (EMB), the 
formal organization responsible for implementing electoral procedures. While EMBs can vary 
considerably in terms of governance, composition, and methods, James et al. (2019) outline three 
sets of tasks that are common to all EMBs: organizing, monitoring, and certifying elections. 
Studies on EMBs address, for example, the importance of staffing (James 2019), budget (Clark 
2019), capacity (Garnett 2019), and, most frequently, autonomy (Mozaffar 2002; Birch 2008; 
Hartlyn et al. 2008; van Ham and Lindberg 2015b; Kerr and Lürhmann 2017; van Ham and 
Garnett 2019). In the majority of studies, these aspects of EMBs exhibit important effects on the 
quality of elections and democracy. Consequently, the improvement of EMB performance and 
independence is now regarded as an important development goal (Catt et al. 2014; Norris 2015; 
Karp et al. 2017).  
The focus of this article is on the capacity of the EMB, meaning their “ability to perform 
functions and achieve their goals” (Garnett 2019). As Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) note, 
elections always have a “margin of error” based on the degree of inaccuracies and deficiencies. 
Some of the most notable issues include delayed, incorrect, or insufficient ballot papers; poorly 
trained poll workers; dead people listed on the voter roll; legitimate voters turned away; voting 
machines breaking down; broken ballot box seals; and long waiting times (Norris 2015, p. 133). 
The size of this margin of error depends on the EMB’s capacity to coordinate, staff, and 
organize the electoral procedure. This in turn depends on competency, financing, and efficiency. 
The role of electoral management bodies (EMBs) at preventing or reducing clientelism has 
gone largely unnoticed in both the literature on electoral integrity and clientelism. This is 
surprising considering the proximity of the two phenomena and the large investments in capacity 
building for electoral management and administration by the donor community. Clientelism is 
likely to be affected by factors that improve other components of electoral integrity, and 
achieving electoral integrity is dependent on deterring clientelistic practices. For example, related 
research on corruption and good governance shows a relatively modest effect of economic 
development (e.g. Rothstein 2011; 2018; Fukuyama 2013), arguing instead for the importance of 
building capable and impartial institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010; 2012).  
Moreover, by directly affecting whether electoral rules and procedures are upheld, EMB 
capacity is likely to alter the perceptions and behavior of political agents. First, EMB capacity 
matters for the credibility of elections (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Birch 2011; Kerr 2014; 
Bowler et al. 2015; Norris 2015, 2019). Where capacity is high, EMBs provide the procedural 
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certainty necessary for the substantive uncertainty of free and fair elections (Mozaffar and 
Schedler 2002). Second, EMBs are an easily identifiable institution with which parties’ and 
voters’ have direct experiences leading up to and on election day (Mozaffar 2002; Elklit and 
Reynolds 2002, 2005; Birch 2011; Kerr 2018). Party officials are likely to be very aware of an 
electoral process ridden with irregularities and incompetence, as this will incidentally either 
benefit or harm them. This also affects what is available to them on the “menu of manipulation” 
(Schedler 2002). Voters, in turn, will be informed of EMB performance before and after 
elections from their own experiences, alongside reporting by media, parties, and civil society 
organizations (Kerr 2014, 2018; Kerr and Lürhmann 2017). In short, where EMBs lack the 
capacity to organize elections efficiently, this leads to distrust in the electoral process and a loss 
of legitimacy for the state institutions. This can have a direct bearing on clientelistic strategies of 
voters, parties, and candidates. 
Theorizing the relationship between EMB capacity and clientelism 
Clientelism involves both costs and benefits for involved actors and that cost-benefit calculation 
affects both the supply of and demand for clientelistic politics. We theorize that EMB capacity 
moderates this calculation for voters, parties, and candidates by increasing the legitimacy of 
elections.  
Voters 
Voters benefit from clientelism through resources – including money, in-kind gifts, and 
other valuable goods or services - given in return for political support. The cost to voters 
includes reduced opportunities to voice a genuine preference, to have an impact on political 
decisions, and generally, to access political representation.  Political actions, be it casting a ballot 
or working for a party, are instead done in exchange for a clientelistic good, and should voters 
take actions that counter the intent of the clientelistic good, they may be punished by having 
valuable resources withdrawn in the future.3  
EMB capacity alters this cost-calculation through its effect on the degree of trust voters 
have in elections as procedures that genuinely determine who governs. Electoral processes 
marred with irregularities, incompetence, limited information, and understaffed polling stations 
                                                 
3 Note that this reasoning serves as the baseline for developmentalist approaches as well. As voters’ income 
increases, their interests and stakes in national political decisions increase, and the costs of not supporting one’s 
preferred party also increase.  
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that are few and far between reduce voters’ trust in the meaningfulness of electoral procedures, 
thereby undermining their ability to voice preferences, impact political decisions, and access 
political representation. In such settings, the opportunities for clientelistic behavior are rife 
because the perceived cost to voters is very low. There is little reason for voters to refuse 
clientelistic benefits in exchange for campaigning or voting for a specific party or candidate in an 
electoral procedure they do not believe functions. As EMB capacity increases, however, so does 
the alternative cost to voters of not voicing their genuine preference and supporting their 
preferred party or candidate. In practical terms, this means that the amount of people who refuse 
clientelistic exchanges increases with EMB capacity, and those still inclined to sell some political 
support should demand more expensive goods or services in return. All else equal, therefore, the 
higher the EMB capacity, the lower the demand for clientelism from voters and the higher the 
costs for parties.  
Parties and candidates 
For parties and candidates, the benefits of clientelistic exchanges consist of securing 
electoral and political support. The costs are primarily the resources it takes to finance the 
clientelistic pyramid, but also the costs of engaging in an unscrupulous or illicit activity. EMB 
capacity affects this cost-calculation by shaping how expensive the clientelistic pyramid is and 
how reliable it is at securing support.  
Presumably, underfinanced and understaffed EMBs will have a hard time upholding ballot 
secrecy, staff impartiality, and competency, offering numerous opportunities for brokers to 
either directly or indirectly monitor voters. As EMB capacity increases, however, two things 
happen. First, brokers require more sophisticated and expensive methods to monitor 
compliance, or alternatively, must shift their focus from swing voters to already loyal ones. 
Either way, this increases the costs of clientelism for parties and candidates. Second, due to less 
monitoring capacity, voters have less reason to fear individual punishment for reneging on their 
promise. Therefore, the incentive to accept clientelistic benefits without following through on 
the commitment will increase, which increases the risk, and thus the cost, for parties and 
candidates. While this effect is restricted to vote-buying in its direct terms, it should spill over to 
all clientelistic practices, since vote buying can be regarded as the bread and butter of clientelism. 
If the larger system of clientelistic exchanges and networks does not produce electoral support in 
the end, there is little incentive to keep it. Consequently, increases in EMB capacity will increase 
the costs of clientelism for parties and candidates, all else equal. The theory is depicted in full in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model. 
 
Measuring Clientelism and EMB Capacity 
As our primary test of the theory, we use data collected by the V-Dem Project, a world-leading 
expert survey covering over 450 indicators from 1789–2019 for most of the world’s political 
units (Pemstein et al. 2019; Coppedge et al. 2020a). V-Dem defines clientelism as relationships 
that “include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) 
in exchange for political support” (Coppedge et al. 2020b, p. 273), which corresponds well to the 
conceptualization of a non-programmatic, contingent distribution of resources.  
As our main dependent variable, the V-Dem clientelism index (v2xnp_client) captures the 
extent to which politics is based on clientelistic relationships (Sigman and Lindberg 2017). The 
index ranges from zero (low clientelism) to one (high clientelism). It is constructed from three 
underlying indicators: the extent of vote- and turnout buying (v2elvotbuy), clientelistic party-voter 
linkages (v2psprlnks), and particularistic government spending (v2dlencmps).4 These three 
components are not exhaustive of clientelistic practices, and the particularistic component to 
some extent includes related but separate practices like pork barrel spending. Nevertheless, the 
measure offers the most comprehensive data on clientelism presently available, reflecting both 
electoral and relational forms of clientelism. We test for aggregate effects of the EMB on overall 
                                                 
4 For these three components of clientelism (v2elvotbuy, v2psprlnks, v2dlencmps) the scales have been reversed so that 
they go from low to high clientelism.  
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levels of clientelism using the clientelism index, as well as, its effects on each of the types of 
clientelism that make up the index. 
V-Dem also has a direct measure of EMB capacity, based on the question “Does the 
Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run 
national election?” (Coppedge et al. 2020b, p. 62), which aligns with the above reviewed 
definition. This indicator serves as our main independent variable of interest. 
Mitigating concerns about measurement bias  
Because the same experts may code values for both clientelism and EMB capacity on the V-Dem 
survey, this introduces some risk of circularity in the measurement. An expert’s view or 
knowledge of clientelism could certainly influence her assessment of EMB capacity, or vice 
versa. In addition, previous answers on one aspect of electoral integrity could prime the coder 
into answering an aligning answer to a later question. Consequently, there is a potential 
measurement bias of unknown direction and magnitude.  
To mitigate concerns of measurement bias, we test the robustness of our findings from the 
V-Dem data using a number of alternative measures of clientelism and EMB capacity. Because 
these alternative measures differ considerably, we evaluate their results based on two criteria. 
First, as any empirical inference hinges on having a valid measurement of the concept (King et 
al. 1994; Adcock and Collier 2001), the measurement’s proximity to EMB capacity or clientelism 
as conceptualized by V-Dem determines how equipped it is at evaluating the degree of bias in 
the V-Dem measure. Second, to maximize comparison with the V-Dem estimations, sample 
sizes should be as similar as possible in the alternative measures, otherwise differences in the 
results could be due to sampling issues.  
To that end, we use four additional measures of EMB capacity. First, the Electoral 
Integrity Project runs the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) survey, which is an expert 
survey that assesses a range of electoral factors at election years for over 150 countries since 
2012 (Norris 2015; Norris and Grömping 2019). The PEI index on the quality of electoral 
procedures consists of four dimensions: management quality, voter information, fair officials, 
and whether elections are run in accordance with the law.5 This fits well with the concept of 
EMB capacity, and the extensive spatial coverage makes the PEI a good robustness check. 
Second, Kelley (2012) has gathered data on pre-election and election day electoral management 
quality through coding electoral reports on 146 countries between 1978–2004. This measure also 
has high validity and good country-year coverage, making it a valuable robustness check. Third,  
                                                 
5 This variable is rescaled to run from 1 to 10 instead of its original scale of 1 to 100.  
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Garnett (2019) has compiled observational data on EMB capacity for 99 countries in 2015 based 
on EMB website analysis. Website analysis restricts the sample to those that have such a website 
in the given year making the coverage comparatively limited, and it is not a direct assessment of 
capacity, but acts as a solid proxy.6 The measurements on EMB capacity are summarized in 
Table 1, including country-year coverage when adjusted to the V-Dem sample frame.  
As alternatives for the dependent variable, we draw on three different datasets with 
measures of vote buying. First, we use the Index of Electoral Malpractice (IEM) compiled by 
Birch (2011),  which measures the extent of vote buying through electoral reports in 58 “new 
and semi-democracies” between 1995–2007.  While the sample only includes certain types of 
regimes, the IEM does have a fair degree of spatial coverage over a period of time. Second, we 
draw on two citizen survey datasets, the Afrobarometer and the World Value Survey (WVS). In 
the Afrobarometer (2013) round 5, respondents in 34 African countries were asked how often 
they had been offered a bribe in return for their vote. In round 6 of the Afrobarometer (2015), 
respondents in 36 countries where asked how often they believe that voters are bribed. The same 
question was asked in WVS wave six (Inglehart et al. 2014), to respondents in 42 countries across 
the world. These survey data only assess the experience of being asked bribes, not taking them, 
and the perceptions of vote-buying, which can differ considerably from the reality. Furthermore, 
the coverage is restricted compared to other measures used in these robustness checks. 
However, surveys do offer a view from the ground that is lacking in the other datasets, and a 
regular citizen might very well be just as knowledgeable of clientelism as an expert coder (e.g. 
Charron 2016). In sum, while neither of these alternative measures fully capture clientelism, and 
coverage is comparatively limited, they do offer additional perspectives on vote buying, one 
important element of clientelism that is most proximally affected by EMB capacity in our theory. 
                                                 
6 Correlation between this measure and V-Dem as reported in Garnett (2019) is 0.43. 
Table 1. Measures of EMB capacity  
V-Dem PEI QED QED Garnett 
Measure 
EMB Capacity: 
Does the Election 
Management Body 
(EMB) have sufficient 
staff and resources to 
administer a well-run 
national election? 
Electoral procedures 
index: 
Additive scale of the 
four components 
Elections were well 
managed; Information 
about voting procedures 
was widely available; 
Election officials were 
fair; Elections were 
conducted in 
accordance with the law. 
Overall pre-election 
administrative 
capacity: 
Captures problems with 
administration, 
commission, voter 
information and 
violence in the period 
before the election  
Election day 
administrative 
capacity: 
Captures problems with 
administration, logistics, 
information and staff 
during election day. 
EMB Capacity: 
Capacity score based on 
14 items divided into 
four groups: results, 
personnel, information 
for voters and 
communication.   
Methodology Expert survey Expert Survey 
Coding based on 
Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices 
Coding based on 
Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices 
Observational data on 
EMB websites 
Coverage 163 countries, 1900-2016 
153 countries, 2012-16 146 countries, 1978-
2004 
146 countries, 1978-
2004 
92 countries, 2015 
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Table 2. Measures of clientelism 
 V-Dem V-Dem V-Dem V-Dem IEM Afrobarometer Afrobarometer WVS 
Measure 
Clientelism 
Index:  
To what extent are 
politics based on 
clientelistic 
relationships? 
Vote buying: 
In this national 
election, was there 
evidence of vote 
and/or turnout 
buying? 
Party-voter 
linkages: 
Among the major 
parties, what is the 
main or most 
common form of 
linkage to their 
constituents? 
Particularistic 
spending: 
Considering the 
profile of social and 
infrastructural 
spending in the 
national budget, how 
"particularistic" or 
"public goods" are 
most expenditures? 
Reports on Vote 
Buying: Was 
vote-buying 
observed? 
Experience of 
Vote Buying:  
How often, if ever 
did a candidate or 
someone from a 
political party offer 
you something, like 
food or a gift or 
money, in return 
for your vote? 
Perceptions of 
Vote Buying:  
In your opinion, 
how often do the 
following things 
occur in this 
country’s elections: 
Voters are bribed 
Perceptions of 
Vote Buying:  
In your opinion, 
how often do the 
following things 
occur in this 
country’s elections: 
Voters are bribed 
Methodology Expert survey Expert survey Expert survey Expert survey Expert coding of electoral reports Citizen survey Citizen survey Citizen survey 
Coverage 163 countries, 1900-2016 
161 countries, 
1900-2016 
163 countries, 
1900-2016 
163 countries,  
1900-2016 
58 countries, 
1995-2007 
34 countries,  
2011-13 
36 countries,  
2014-15 
42 countries,  
2010-14 
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Table 2 summarizes the measurements of clientelism, and Table 5 (Appendix) provides 
descriptive statistics for all measures of the dependent and independent variables.  
Empirical strategy 
For the primary tests using V-Dem data, all estimations employ time-series cross-sectional 
analysis. Fixed-effects estimates are generally the preferred approach for capturing developments 
within countries over time, where fixed country-level confounding cannot be fully measured by 
the included covariates. Nevertheless, we also report random effects results for the main V-Dem 
models in the Appendix (see Table 6), as research on panel data estimation is quite divided about 
which approach is more appropriate (e.g. Bell and Jones 2015; Clark and Linzer 2015). We 
assume the relationship between EMB capacity and clientelism is linear, an assumption born out 
in a correlation plot using the V-Dem data (Figure 2, Appendix). Consequently, all estimations 
are run with a linear regression.  
Control variables 
To leverage the greatest possible sample size for the main analysis we report both a restricted 
model and an extended model. The restricted model includes three core controls – GDP per 
capita (logged), GDP growth, and a non-electoral measure of democracy from V-Dem that 
captures how well countries uphold liberal democratic components like individual freedom and 
liberties. Consequently, these variables control for economic development and democracy, the 
usual suspects in the clientelism literature. The restricted model thus controls for the central 
country-level influences on this relationship while allowing for a maximized sample size.  
For the extended model, we include additional controls highlighted in literature, including 
the degree of party competition, free and fair media, EMB autonomy, population size, ethnic 
fractionalization, urbanization, and natural resource wealth. Many of these are hypothesized 
causal mechanisms from the dominant modernization theories about clientelism. Others likely 
confound the relationship between the EMB capacity and levels of clientelism. These additional 
controls restrict the sample size considerably, resulting in less coverage and less comparability 
with the robustness-checks, as many of these cannot be estimated with the sample in the 
extended model. Therefore, we focus on the restricted model for our main analysis.  
Mitigating concerns about endogeneity 
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Our empirical strategy seeks to mitigate potential endogeneity bias between EMB capacity and 
clientelism. As Norris (2019, p. 398) points out, “The institutional arrangements of electoral 
integrity are not exogenous to levels of electoral integrity or democratization.”  There is 
considerable risk that EMB capacity is in part affected by the levels of clientelism. First, 
clientelism incentivizes embezzlement and corruption that can affect aspects of EMB capacity 
like staff performance, appointments, and budget. Second, clientelistic systems are informal 
institutions, with practices that can spread into other areas of public administration, decreasing 
the EMB’s capacity to enforce formal rules. Third, clientelism diverts public resources, which in 
turn can diminish the resources available to the EMB. Finally, state investments in EMB capacity 
are likely to depend on pressure from voters and parties, a pressure that in turn can depend on 
preferences for or against clientelism. Consequently, the causal arrow for any observed negative 
relationship between EMB capacity and clientelism could go either way.  
We employ three strategies to mitigate against the endogeneity problem. First, we use one- 
and five-year lagged measures of EMB capacity for each estimation. This is a standard technique 
to ensure the temporal sequence of the relationship works in the theorized direction. Second, we 
treat endogeneity as omitted variable bias (King et al. 1994). The omitted variable in this case is 
corruption, as a majority of the above listed sources of endogeneity stem from clientelism’s close 
connection to the informal institution of corruption, and risk of spurring wider corruption that 
undermines the EMB’s capacity. Third, we employ an instrumental variable approach. To be 
valid, an instrument must be correlated with the endogenous predictor but not directly related to 
the outcome variable (i.e. any effects on the outcome occur through its mediation of the 
instrumented predictor) (Sovey and Green 2011). We instrument EMB capacity with the regional 
average of EMB capacity in that year, excluding the country in question. The regional average of 
EMB capacity should be a good predictor of the country’s EMB capacity due to regional 
commonalities in institutional settings and trajectories making them likely to influence and follow 
each other. We verify this first criteria empirically based on the first-stage estimation F-statistic 
of 81, well above the common rule of thumb of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). It is unlikely that 
average EMB capacity within other countries in the region will have any direct relation to 
clientelism within a given country (or any unobserved determinants thereof), since this should 
not affect the actors and contextual factors that determine a country’s clientelism. Thus, we 
argue that the regional average also satisfies the second criteria for an instrumental variable 
(which cannot be directly observed or tested, Sovey and Green 2011). 
To summarize, the empirical strategy aims to assess the relationship between EMB 
capacity and clientelism for a large spatial and temporal sample and controlling for a host of  
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Table 3. Restricted model.        
  (3.1) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(3.2) 
Vote buying 
(3.3) 
Party-voter 
linkages 
(3.4) 
Particularistic 
spending 
(3.5) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(3.6) 
Vote buying 
(3.7) 
Party-voter 
linkages 
(3.8) 
Particularistic 
spending 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.052*** -0.317*** -0.201*** -0.312***     
 (0.012) (0.087) (0.063) (0.064)     
EMB Capacity (Lag5)     -0.040*** -0.239*** -0.144** -0.233*** 
     (0.011) (0.078) (0.056) (0.057) 
Liberal component -0.089 0.687 -0.923*** -0.982*** -0.128** 0.491 -1.114*** -1.243*** 
 (0.058) (0.451) (0.285) (0.367) (0.058) (0.457) (0.269) (0.355) 
GDP per capita Log -0.044*** -0.280*** -0.201*** -0.217*** -0.050*** -0.309*** -0.229*** -0.254*** 
 (0.010) (0.067) (0.045) (0.053) (0.011) (0.071) (0.045) (0.056) 
GDP growth 0.031*** 0.025 0.160*** -0.059 0.027** -0.065 0.158*** -0.058 
 (0.011) (0.143) (0.061) (0.073) (0.010) (0.140) (0.060) (0.076) 
Constant 0.921*** 2.237*** 2.206*** 1.612*** 0.982*** 2.540*** 2.516*** 2.015*** 
 (0.089) (0.577) (0.396) (0.462) (0.091) (0.613) (0.389) (0.471) 
R2-within 0.322 0.178 0.295 0.373 0.304 0.160 0.285 0.348 
R2-between 0.547 0.339 0.445 0.410 0.519 0.320 0.410 0.413 
R2-overall 0.533 0.348 0.471 0.436 0.522 0.337 0.461 0.428 
Countries 163 161 163 163 163 161 163 163 
Observations 12 091 3 159 12 091 12 092 11 942 3 114 11 942 11 943 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. Model 2 and 6 has fewer observations as vote buying is only measured at 
elections years. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
important variables, while taking steps to avoid measurement bias and endogeneity. For the 
robustness checks, we draw on eight different measurements of EMB capacity and clientelism 
that provide the best alternative measurements in terms of validity and sample size. We address 
concerns about endogeneity using lagged independent variables, controlling for the assumed 
source of endogeneity as well as employing an instrumental variable approach.  
Results 
Table 3 shows the results for the V-Dem clientelism index and its components with the 
restricted model using both one- and five-year lags on EMB capacity. There is a significant and 
strong negative relationship between EMB capacity and clientelism. For the one-year lagged 
EMB capacity in Model 3.1, a one-point increase (on roughly a seven-point scale) decreases 
clientelism by about 0.052. In other words, moving from the lowest to highest EMB capacity 
within this model corresponds to a 0.35 decrease in clientelism, or a third of the total scale. By 
comparison, the effect size for GDP per capita, a proxy for development and the most 
commonly cited tool for decreasing clientelism, is more modest. All else equal, doubling GDP 
per capita yields a decrease of just 0.03 on the clientelism index. When we disaggregate the 
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components of clientelism in Models 3.2–3.4, EMB capacity has a corresponding negative effect, 
although this is somewhat lower for the voter-party linkages component. Looking at Models 3.5–
3.8, we see that while the coefficient for EMB capacity when lagged 5 years is somewhat smaller 
on all four dependent variables, it is still significant with a strong negative relationship. When 
estimating the same models using random effects, we see more or less identical results (Table 6, 
Appendix).  
Table 4 provides estimates with the extended model on the same dependent variables with 
one- and five-year lags of EMB capacity. Note that the liberal component is dropped from these 
models due to a high degree of collinearity with the measure of free and fair media (access to 
information and freedom of expression). Furthermore, the sample is considerably smaller (5,342 
country-years as compared to 12,091 in the restricted model), primarily due to the ethnic 
fractionalization-measure from CREG starting in 1946 (Nardulli et al. 2012) and the urbanization 
and population measures stopping at 2000 (Clio-infra 2018; Coppedge et al. 2020b). When 
looking at the clientelism index, vote buying and particularistic spending for both the one- and 
five-year lagged models, the results are very similar to and some coefficients even larger than, 
those in the restricted model (Table 3). However, the party linkages-component drops below 
standard significance levels for both the one- and five-year lagged models (p-value is 0.291 for 
Model 4.3, and 0.835 for Model 4.7). Although the smaller sample size can play a part, it suggests 
that the supply of this element of clientelism has less to do with EMB capacity.  Overall, 
however, Table 4 shows that the expected relationship between EMB capacity and clientelism is 
robust to additional controls despite the limited sample. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that some 
variables that are often highlighted in the clientelism literature show little relationship to 
clientelism within this model and sample, including urbanization, natural resource wealth, and 
ethnic fractionalization.7  
Assessing alternative measures of clientelism and EMB capacity 
In the Appendix, we report estimates using alternative measures of clientelism and EMB 
capacity, as well as additional tests for endogeneity. Table 11 (Appendix) reports results from 
ordinal logistic regressions using alternative indicators of vote-buying in the restricted model 
with a one-year lagged EMB capacity.8 Because the IEM has an unbalanced panel, results are  
                                                 
7 Although the effect of these variables could be soaked up by the inclusion of GDP per capita in the models.  
8 IEM, WVS, and Afrobarometer have four-point or five-point ordinal measures of vote buying, making ordered 
logistic regression models appropriate.  IEM records multiple observations in a given year for some countries 
because they held more than one election. As panel data regression cannot be estimated with multiple observations 
within a time unit, we take a “weakest link” aggregation strategy (Goertz and Dixon 2006), meaning that the election 
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Table 4. Extended model.         
  (4.1) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(4.2) 
Vote buying 
(4.3) 
Party-voter 
linkages 
(4.4) 
Particularistic 
spending 
(4.5) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(4.6) 
Vote buying 
(4.7) 
Party-voter 
linkages 
(4.8) 
Particularistic 
spending 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.057*** -0.379*** -0.102 -0.290***     
 (0.015) (0.086) (0.096) (0.082)     
EMB Capacity (Lag5)     -0.029*** -0.239*** -0.011 -0.104** 
     (0.009) (0.065) (0.053) (0.049) 
GDP per capita Log -0.044*** -0.230** -0.302*** -0.147 -0.047*** -0.235** -0.322*** -0.177* 
 (0.015) (0.106) (0.083) (0.090) (0.017) (0.108) (0.087) (0.096) 
GDP growth -0.002 -0.038 0.013 -0.041 -0.002 -0.049 0.009 -0.039 
 (0.018) (0.233) (0.100) (0.132) (0.019) (0.247) (0.101) (0.136) 
Party competition -0.025* -0.111 -0.144* -0.238*** -0.036** -0.164 -0.171* -0.299*** 
 (0.014) (0.099) (0.085) (0.083) (0.015) (0.106) (0.090) (0.089) 
Access to information 
and freedom of 
expression 
0.015 1.239*** -0.407 -0.432 0.021 1.246*** -0.406 -0.413 
(0.042) (0.296) (0.288) (0.287) (0.044) (0.305) (0.291) (0.307) 
EMB autonomy -0.012 -0.117 -0.149** 0.045 -0.028*** -0.201*** -0.187*** -0.047 
 (0.011) (0.077) (0.071) (0.071) (0.011) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urbanization 0.025 0.410 0.719 0.239 0.045 0.473 0.769 0.353 
 (0.100) (0.850) (0.526) (0.597) (0.104) (0.879) (0.520) (0.618) 
Natural resource 
production per capita 
0.000** -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000* -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-0.289 -0.945 -1.493 -0.445 -0.321 -1.173 -1.585 -0.648 
(0.189) (0.837) (1.025) (1.117) (0.204) (0.840) (1.062) (1.222) 
Constant 0.957*** 1.697** 3.164*** 0.753 0.990*** 1.809** 3.352*** 1.040 
 (0.120) (0.718) (0.634) (0.750) (0.133) (0.760) (0.662) (0.805) 
R2-within 0.269 0.229 0.275 0.218 0.229 0.190 0.268 0.181 
R2-between 0.369 0.392 0.285 0.343 0.295 0.318 0.232 0.337 
R2-overall 0.385 0.388 0.333 0.362 0.308 0.319 0.287 0.333 
Countries 131 121 131 131 131 121 131 131 
Observations 5 342 1 376 5 342 5 342 5 334 1 374 5 334 5 334 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. Liberal component not included in the models as it is too highly 
correlated to freedom of expression and alternative sources of information. Model 2 and 6 has fewer observations as vote buying is only 
measured at elections years. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01        
 
reported for both TSCS random effects estimation and pooled OLS, to show that the results are 
robust to the latter, more parsimonious estimation (Gelman 2007, pp. 175-77). Both Model 11.1 
and 11.2 suggest that EMB capacity has a significant and strong negative relationship with vote 
buying. However, for the three citizen survey measures, the estimated coefficient for EMB 
capacity is non-significant (p-value is 0.224 for Model 11.3, 0.318 for Model 11.4 and 0.114 for 
Model 11.5).  
To some extent, the divergent findings in Table 11 may come down to a question of who 
is better-suited to evaluate country-level trends in vote buying: experts, electoral observers, or 
                                                 
with the highest reported vote buying in IEM is used. This makes for a more conservative estimation, by taking the 
“worst” election of each year. The WVS and Afrobarometer are estimated with multilevel models that cluster the 
individual responses at the country-level. 
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citizens themselves. These results thus offer an avenue for future research, adding to discussions 
about whether expert opinions are more accurate than mass surveys. If citizens are just as good 
at assessing clientelism as experts, it is potentially problematic that neither measure directly 
assessing citizens perceptions about vote buying shows a significant relationship to EMB 
capacity. However, in terms of coverage and measurement proximity, it could also be argued that 
IEM provides a better measure, and it thus offers important support for the V-Dem findings.  
Table 12 (Appendix) provides results for the alternative indicators of EMB capacity.9 
With the PEI, there is a significant and strong negative relationship. A one point-increase in 
electoral management procedures (on a 10-point scale) is associated with a 0.06 decrease in 
clientelism. Considering that this variable spans from about 1.8 to 9.8, moving from least to 
most amounts to a decrease in clientelism of about half the scale. Similarly, the QED-data shows 
a significant, negative relationship betweeb pre-election administrative capacity and clientelism, 
but no significant relationship for election-day administrative capacity. This further supports the 
V-Dem results, and in addition, suggests that certain aspects of EMB capacity may matter more 
than others.  However, when EMB capacity is estimated through website analysis using Garnett 
(2019), there is no significant observed relationship with clientelism. This null effect could be the 
result of selection bias in a small (92 countries) sample for only one year. 
When looking at the results from these robustness checks, it is noteworthy that V-Dem, 
IEM, PEI and QED are all measured based on either direct expert assessments or coding of 
reports written by experts on a certain election. By contrast, data from the Afrobarometer, WVS, 
and Garnett – datasets that do not produce supporting evidence – come from non-expert 
sources like mass surveys or factual coding by researchers. This suggests that different data-
generating methods produce different results for the observed relationship between EMB 
capacity and clientelism. Furthermore, these robustness checks indicate that EMB capacity may 
exhibit a weaker relationship with some varieties of clientelism. Finally, the three datasets that do 
not provide supporting evidence are also more restrictive in sample or have some questionable 
concept-measurement validity. Thus, the results of this empirical investigation suggest that the 
observed negative association between EMB capacity and supplies of clientelism using V-Dem 
data is unlikely to stem from measurement bias.  
 
                                                 
9 Like IEM, QED records multiple observations for some country-years, and weakest link” aggregation (Goertz and 
Dixon 2006), i.e. taking the elections with the lowest reported EMB capacity, is used. The PEI and Garnett-data 
have singular scores for each country and are therefore analyzed with pooled OLS estimations. 
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Addressing endogeneity concerns 
To address endogeneity beyond using lagged independent variables, Table 13 (Appendix) shows 
the results when treating the endogeneity as an omitted variable bias. For Models 13.1-13.4 using 
the V-Dem measure of corruption, the estimated relationship of one- and five-year lags of EMB-
capacity is robust to including corruption, and the coefficient is very similar to the main models. 
While only the one-year lag has a significant (negative) coefficient when controlling for 
corruption using the WGI measure, this measure is only marginally significant and the model 
employs more restricted sample. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the drop in 
significance occurs due to a reduction of endogeneity bias (by including an important omitted 
variable) or if this null result is really driven by sample bias.  
An instrumental variable estimation further confirms that endogeneity is not driving the 
relationship between EMB capacity and clientelism. Table 14 (Appendix) shows that using the 
regional average of EMB capacity as an instrument for EMB capacity, there is a yet again 
significant and strong negative association (coefficient = -0.063).10 Consequently, employing 
lagged dependent variables, treating endogeneity as an omitted variable bias, and an instrumental 
variable approach largely support to the theorized relationship between EMB capacity and the 
supply of clientelism.  
Additional Robustness checks 
As a consequence of the varied nature of clientelism, however, there could be important 
temporal and spatial heterogeneity disguised in this full sample. Therefore, we estimate split 
samples for six world regions11 and two separate time periods: 1946-2016 and 1974-2016. These 
two periods signify the start of two trends in regime-changes, the end of WWII and the 
beginning of the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991). Table 7 (Appendix) shows the 
results for a one-year lagged EMB capacity using split samples for each of six world regions, 
along with the full sample for comparison. The results suggest that EMB capacity has the largest 
influence on clientelism in two regions: Western Europe/North America and Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia. However, estimates in Table 8 (Appendix) show that there is still a 
significant, negative relationship, albeit smaller (coefficient is -0.033 as compared to -0.052 in the 
                                                 
10 We also employed two additional instrumental variables that yielded negative but not statistically significant 
results. These results, and a discussion why we find them less appropriate than the instrumental variable discussed in 
the article, can be found in the appendix.  
11 Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North 
Africa, Western Europe and North America, Asia and Pacific. 
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full sample) of one-year lagged EMB capacity when excluding these regions. Consequently, the 
relationship between EMB capacity and the supply of clientelism is not driven by any regional 
outliers, even if it is particularly pronounced for Western Europe/North America and Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia. Table 9 (Appendix), in turn shows the results for 1946-2016 and 1974-
2016 using one- and five-year lags of EMB capacity, and we see that the relationship remains 
significant and the coefficients only somewhat smaller within these samples. 
It also is possible that EMB capacity, rather than having an independent effect, acts as a 
proxy for a more general administrative capacity. Therefore, we run estimations that include 
Hanson and Sigman’s (2013) measure of state capacity and the WGI measure of government 
effectiveness (Kaufman and Kraay 2016) to assess if the hypothesized effect of EMB capacity is 
robust to, and thus independent of, these larger aspects of state administrative capacity. Figure 3 
and 4 (Appendix) show correlation plots between EMB capacity and state capacity and WGI 
government effectiveness, respectively. Both plots show that the variables are indeed related, but 
that it is possible to have high levels of one and low levels of the other.  
Table 10 (Appendix) presents the results when including these measures of state capacity, 
using both the restricted and extended model for Hanson and Sigman’s (2013) measure (Models 
10.1-10.4), but only the restricted model for the WGI measure (Models 10.5-10.6) as the 
extended model renders too few observations. The findings with one- and five-year lags of EMB 
capacity remain robust when including state capacity as an additional covariate; the coefficient 
size is almost the same as the restricted and extended model without state capacity. In Model 
10.5, we see that EMB capacity lagged one year has a somewhat smaller, but still large and 
significant negative effect on the clientelism index when including government effectiveness. 
However, the five-year lagged EMB capacity is not significantly related clientelism when 
including the WGI measure. Thus, while the estimates show some variation when controlling for 
overall state capacity, the results generally continue to support a negative relationship between 
EMB capacity and the supply of clientelism.  
Conclusions 
Until now, economic development has dominated our understanding of the detriments of 
clientelism, resulting in limited scholarly attention to how institutions of electoral management 
affect clientelistic behavior.  This article takes a first step at integrating the proximate, but until 
now separate, research fields of clientelism and electoral integrity. We argue that EMB capacity 
deters clientelism through two mechanisms. First, it increases trust in elections, increasing the 
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costs for voters who engage in clientelism rather than voicing their genuine preferences. Second, 
increases in EMB capacity undermine broker monitoring capacity, which increases voter moral 
hazard and the costs of hiring brokers, leading to higher party costs of engaging in clientelism. 
As such, we theorize that improvements in EMB capacity should be associated with declines in 
the supply of clientelism, all else equal.   
This theory is tested using V-Dem data covering over 160 countries from 1900–2016. A 
strong, negative relationship is observed when using both a restricted and extended set of 
controls and for temporal and regional subsamples Using several alternative measures of EMB 
capacity and clientelism to assess concerns of measurement bias, the variables with highest 
concept-measurement validity and country-year coverage support the findings in the V-Dem 
analysis. However, the measures with more restrictive samples or questionable validity report no 
significant effect, leaving questions about whether only certain aspects of EMB capacity and 
clientelism are related to each other. The relationship also largely holds when using one- and 
five-year lags, including corruption as a control, as well as using the regional average of EMB 
capacity as an instrumental variable, suggesting that the results are not driven by endogeneity. 
While the relationship is most pronounced in two out of six world regions, there is still a strong 
negative association between EMB capacity and clientelism when excluding these regions. 
Furthermore, the relationship is generally robust to controlling for state capacity and government 
effectiveness, suggesting that effects of the EMB are independent of overall state capacity. 
From this, we conclude that increases to EMB capacity have a negative effect on 
clientelism within countries. This finding bridges the literature on clientelism and electoral 
integrity, suggesting that scholars in these fields may provide valuable lessons for each other. 
Our results complement the dominant focus on economic development in the clientelism 
literature, taking a step toward a more encompassing understanding by highlighting how formal 
institutions and their performance matter in this process. Lastly, our work provides practical 
empirical insights. For donors concerned about clientelism and electoral integrity, prioritizing 
investments in capacity building programs for electoral management bodies may provide fruitful 
dividends.      
Looking ahead, this article illuminates several promising areas for future research. We 
provide a quantitative, within-country overview of the relationship. Assessments at the micro-
level would help uncover to what extent the relationship actually depends on the presumed 
causal chain or some other mechanisms. Furthermore, future work could address what elements 
of EMB capacity affect what components of clientelism, so as to understand when and why we 
should expect this relationship to exist. Such research will help us understand some of the null 
 24 
results in the robustness checks in this article and help policymakers decide which types of 
capacity building programs to prioritize and in which settings. Finally, a further integration of the 
literatures on electoral integrity and clientelism would greatly improve our understanding of how 
electoral management and electoral institutions affect clientelism, and vice versa. As much time 
and money goes into putting lessons from these studies into practice by donors and non-
governmental organizations, such research could bolster efforts to achieve important 
development and governance goals. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
EMB Capacity      
V-Dem EMB Capacity 12 124 0.2101 1.5270 -3.109 3.131 
PEI Electoral Procedures 750 6.7815 1.8976 1.875 9.7941 
QED Pre Election Capacity 858 3.8531 0.4776 1 4 
QED Election Day Capacity 844 3.7026 0.6752 1 4 
Garnett EMB Capacity 92 2.2636 0.6953 .33 3 
Clientelism      
V-Dem Clientelism Index 12 124 0.4951 0.2701 .013 .985 
V-Dem Vote Buying 3 177 0.0929 1.4105 -3.067 3.184 
V-Dem Voter-Party Linkages 12 124 0.0174 1.4528 -3.267 3.365 
V-Dem Particularistic Spending 12 125 -0.7676 1.3093 -3.711 3.035 
Afrobarometer Vote Buying Experience 50 536 0.2746 0.7069 0 3 
Afrobarometer Vote Buying Perceptions 49 017 1.4685 1.0866 0 3 
WVS Vote Buying Perceptions 51 120 2.4881 1.0713 1 4 
IEM Vote Buying 149 1.4966 0.8670 1 5 
Note: All descriptive statistics are adjusted to the data when included in regressions using the restricted model.  
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Table 6: Restricted model, random effects.   
  (6.1) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(6.2) 
Vote buying 
(6.3) 
Party-voter 
linkages 
(6.4) 
Particularistic 
spending 
(6.5) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(6.6) 
Vote buying 
(6.7) 
Party-voter 
linkages 
(6.8) 
Particularistic 
spending 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.053*** -0.338*** -0.206*** -0.311***         
 (0.011) (0.081) (0.063) (0.064)     
EMB Capacity (Lag5)     -0.041*** -0.268*** -0.150*** -0.234*** 
     (0.011) (0.073) (0.056) (0.057) 
Liberal component  -0.093 0.502 -0.926*** -0.997*** -0.132** 0.304 -1.117*** -1.254*** 
 (0.058) (0.426) (0.283) (0.363) (0.057) (0.428) (0.267) (0.351) 
GDP per capita Log -0.043*** -0.253*** -0.197*** -0.212*** -0.048*** -0.276*** -0.224*** -0.247*** 
 (0.010) (0.062) (0.045) (0.052) (0.010) (0.066) (0.045) (0.054) 
GDP growth 0.031*** 0.031 0.162*** -0.059 0.028*** -0.052 0.159*** -0.057 
 (0.011) (0.146) (0.061) (0.073) (0.010) (0.145) (0.060) (0.076) 
Constant 0.926*** 2.190*** 2.235*** 1.606*** 0.986*** 2.452*** 2.540*** 1.996*** 
 (0.090) (0.535) (0.405) (0.467) (0.092) (0.570) (0.399) (0.478) 
R2-within 0.322 0.176 0.295 0.373 0.304 0.158 0.285 0.348 
R2-between 0.553 0.383 0.448 0.412 0.527 0.373 0.413 0.415 
R2-overall 0.535 0.378 0.472 0.437 0.526 0.372 0.462 0.429 
Countries 163 161 163 163 163 161 163 163 
Observations 12 091 3 159 12 091 12 092 11 942 3 114 11 942 11 943 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and random effects. Model 2 and 6 has fewer observations as vote buying is only measured 
at elections years. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 2. Correlation plot EMB capacity and clientelism 
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Table 7: Restricted model, regional samples 
 
(7.1) 
Clientelism 
Index 
Full Sample 
(7.2) 
Clientelism 
Index 
Eastern 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
(7.3) 
Clientelism 
Index 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
(7.4) 
Clientelism 
Index 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
(7.5) 
Clientelism 
Index 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
(7.6) 
Clientelism 
Index 
Western 
Europe & 
North 
America 
(7.7) 
Clientelism 
Index 
Asia & Pacific 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.052*** -0.108** -0.032 -0.007 -0.033 -0.099*** -0.019 
 (0.012) (0.040) (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) 
Liberal component  -0.089 0.253* -0.103 -0.346*** -0.121 -0.190*** -0.281** 
 (0.058) (0.127) (0.064) (0.084) (0.111) (0.062) (0.122) 
GDP per capita Log -0.044*** -0.049 -0.097** 0.003 -0.013 -0.028** -0.048 
 (0.010) (0.038) (0.040) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.029) 
GDP growth 0.031*** 0.086* 0.026 0.028*** 0.002 0.072*** 0.058 
 (0.011) (0.051) (0.035) (0.010) (0.017) (0.020) (0.044) 
Constant 0.921*** 0.817*** 1.500*** 0.708*** 0.709*** 0.778*** 1.041*** 
 (0.089) (0.289) (0.331) (0.164) (0.135) (0.121) (0.206) 
R2-within 0.322 0.308 0.462 0.152 0.112 0.735 0.385 
R2-between 0.547 0.344 0.759 0.174 0.314 0.751 0.085 
R2-overall 0.533 0.289 0.582 0.242 0.223 0.731 0.237 
Countries 163 29 23 20 46 24 21 
Observations 12 091 1 184 2 306 1 158 3 080 2 573 1 790 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Restricted model, without regions 
 
(8.1) 
Clientelism Index 
W/O Western Europe 
& North America 
(8.2) 
Clientelism Index 
W/O Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia 
(8.3) 
Clientelism Index 
W/O Western Europe & North 
America, Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.048*** -0.038*** -0.033*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Liberal component -0.055 -0.192*** -0.167*** 
 (0.063) (0.048) (0.053) 
GDP per capita Log -0.040*** -0.047*** -0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) 
GDP growth 0.025** 0.032*** 0.025** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant 0.917*** 0.993*** 1.006*** 
 
(0.114) (0.087) (0.113) 
R2-within 0.245 0.363 0.280 
R2-between 0.353 0.561 0.210 
R2-overall 0.312 0.562 0.274 
Countries 139 134 110 
Observations 9 518 10 907 8 334 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9. Restricted model, temporal subsamples. 
  
 (9.1) 
Clientelism Index 
1946-2016 
(9.2) 
Clientelism Index 
1974-2016 
(9.3) 
Clientelism Index 
1946-2016 
(9.4) 
Clientelism Index 
1974-2016 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.052*** -0.044***   
 (0.013) (0.014)   
EMB Capacity (Lag5)   -0.038*** -0.034*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) 
Liberal component -0.111* -0.067 -0.154** -0.098 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.061) (0.064) 
GDP per capita Log -0.022** -0.018 -0.025** -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
GDP growth 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.035** 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant 0.748*** 0.692*** 0.789*** 0.701*** 
 (0.098) (0.116) (0.102) (0.121) 
R2-within 0.225 0.144 0.202 0.127 
R2-between 0.620 0.632 0.604 0.633 
R2-overall 0.537 0.546 0.529 0.551 
Countries 163 163 163 163 
Observations 9 964 6 571 9 849 6 485 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 3. Correlation plot EMB capacity and state capacity 
 
 
Figure 4. Correlation plot EMB capacity and government effectiveness 
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Table 10. Controlling for state capacity and government effectiveness. 
  
(10.1) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(10.2) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(10.3) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(10.4) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(10.5) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(10.6) 
Clientelism 
Index 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.051***  -0.064***  -0.033***  
 (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.013)  
EMB Capacity (Lag5)  -0.035***  -0.034***  -0.013 
  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
State capacity -0.009 -0.018* -0.003 -0.008   
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)   
Government effectiveness     0.019 0.017 
     (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant 0.731*** 0.720*** 0.938*** 0.941*** 0.685*** 0.717*** 
 (0.151) (0.158) (0.201) (0.220) (0.101) (0.104) 
R2-within 0.190 0.165 0.249 0.204 0.160 0.140 
R2-between 0.592 0.599 0.359 0.311 0.541 0.491 
R2-overall 0.536 0.539 0.363 0.304 0.514 0.466 
Countries 153 152 131 131 163 163 
Observations 6 648 6 565 4 514 4 511 2 914 2 908 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. Model 1-2 and 5-6 use the restricted set of controls, model 3-4 use the 
extended set of controls. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 40 
 
Table 11. Restricted model, alternative measures of clientelism. 
 
(11.1) 
IEM 
Vote Buying 
OLS 
(11.2) 
IEM  
Vote Buying 
RE 
(11.3) 
Afrobarometer 
Experience of 
Vote Buying 
(11.4) 
Afrobarometer 
Perceptions of 
Vote Buying 
(11.5) 
WVS 
Perceptions of 
Vote Buying 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.634** -0.746** -0.222 -0.174 -0.396 
 (0.278) (0.353) (0.182) (0.174) (0.250) 
Liberal component 0.444 0.848 -0.294 1.042* 0.588 
 (0.816) (0.971) (0.806) (0.633) (0.768) 
GDP per capita Log -0.318 -0.372 -0.444*** 0.243* -0.183 
 (0.373) (0.425) (0.171) (0.135) (0.299) 
GDP growth 1.894 2.535 -4.500* -2.280 -1.556 
 (1.748) (1.753) (2.643) (2.768) (1.478) 
Countries 58 58 34 36 42 
Observations 149 149 50 536 49 017 51 120 
Note: All regressions are run with robust standard errors. Model 1 uses pooled OLS with an ordinal dependent variable. Model 2 uses TSCS 
random effects estimation with an ordinal dependent variable. Model 3-5 uses multilevel estimations using an ordinal dependent variable. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 41 
 
Table 12. Restricted model, alternative measures of EMB Capacity   
(12.1) 
Clientelism Index 
(12.2) 
Clientelism Index 
(12.3) 
Clientelism Index 
(12.4) 
Clientelism Index 
PEI Electoral Management -0.060*** 
   
 
(0.005) 
   
QED Pre-Election Capacity 
 
-0.015** 
  
  
(0.007) 
  
QED Election Day Capacity 
  
-0.014 
 
   
(0.041) 
 
Garnett EMB Capacity 
   
-0.014 
    
(0.041) 
Liberal component -0.218*** -0.245*** -0.244*** -0.440*** 
 
(0.036) (0.052) (0.054) (0.091) 
GDP per capita Log -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.092*** 
 
(0.006) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) 
GDP growth -0.282** 0.040 0.048 0.126 
 
(0.118) (0.035) (0.037) (0.496) 
Constant 1.515*** 1.323*** 1.272*** 1.603*** 
 
(0.042) (0.113) (0.114) (0.176) 
R2 0.625 0.537 0.553 0.510 
Countries 163 149 149 92 
Observations 750 858 844 92 
Note: Regressions are run with robust standard errors. Model 1 and 4 uses pooled OLS. Model 2 and 3 are TSCS models using fixed effects. 
Overall R2 reported for TSCS models.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 13. Controlling for corruption.   
  
(13.1) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(13.2) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(13.3) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(13.4) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(13.5) 
Clientelism 
Index 
(13.6) 
Clientelism 
Index 
EMB Capacity (Lag1) -0.050***  -0.043***  -0.031**  
 (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.013)  
EMB Capacity (Lag5)  -0.041***  -0.020***  -0.010 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Corruption index 0.488*** 0.493*** 0.449*** 0.467***   
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.051) (0.056)   
Control of Corruption     -0.030* -0.031 
     (0.018) (0.019) 
Constant 0.683*** 0.726*** 0.691*** 0.707*** 0.639*** 0.678*** 
 (0.073) (0.076) (0.101) (0.110) (0.102) (0.104) 
R2-within 0.514 0.499 0.446 0.424 0.164 0.146 
R2-between 0.691 0.682 0.744 0.724 0.670 0.633 
R2-overall 0.701 0.695 0.739 0.725 0.640 0.607 
Countries 163 163 131 131 163 163 
Observations 12 086 11 937 5 342 5 334 2 919 2 911 
Note: All regressions run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. Model 1-2 and 5-6 use the restricted set of controls, model 3-4 use the 
extended set of controls. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Instrumental Variables 
For reasons of transparency, we report three different instrumental variable approaches that we 
have tested. The first instrument and the one discussed in the paper (Table A10), uses the 
regional average (not including the country in question) of EMB capacity as an instrument. The 
reasoning for this instrument is presented in the article. 
The second, found in Table A11, uses the UN population projections dataset to create 
variables that measures the years since the last census (model 1) and the years since the last 
census or independence (model 2). The rationale behind this instrument is that a country’s 
statistical capacity and demographic knowledge should affect the conditions for capable electoral 
management, all the while not likely to be related to clientelism in any way other than through 
this connection to EMB capacity. The problem with this approach, compared to using the 
regional average, is that this is a coarse method of assessing statistical capacity/demographic 
knowledge, that do not capture any nuances within this. Furthermore, it is also possible that the 
data is influenced by the UN having declared that a country should hold a census at least once a 
decade, which makes it possible that some countries hold these without it representing, nor them 
really gaining, statistical capacity/democraphic knowledge.  
The third instrument, found in Table A13, uses the proportion of years with EMB capacity 
as an instrument. This is inspired by Ruiz-Rufino and Birch (2020), who uses proportion of 
elections with an autonomous EMB as an instrument for EMB autonomy. Following Ruiz-
Rufino and Birch (2020), we measured a year with EMB capacity as scoring 3 or more on the 0-4 
point scale on the ordinal V-Dem measure of EMB capacity (v2elembcap_ord). Model 1 in Table 
A12 shows this instrument using a 1-year lag, model 2 shows it with a 5-year lag and model 3 
with a 10-year lag. We argue that this approach is less appropriate than using the regional average 
for two reasons. First, there’s the problem of assuming that past EMB capacity should only 
relate to clientelism through present-day EMB capacity. We cannot know how far back the risk 
endogeneity persists, and any cutoff in time where it is assumed to be exogenous is arbitrary. 
Second, the identification of country-years as either having or not having EMB capacity based on 
the ordinal measure is coarse, and loses significant variation within the continuous variable of 
EMB capacity.  
We thus argue that using the regional average as an instrument both better satisfies the 
criteria for instrumental variables, and at the same time is not being fraught with any of the 
estimation problems in the other instruments. Looking at the F-test of the first stage regression, 
as well as an Anderson & Rubin-test and Wald-test, in Table A14 also shows that the regional 
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average is also the most appropriate instrument in terms of the instrument’s relation to the 
endogenous predictor EMB capacity.   
 
Table 14. IV Regional Average of EMB Capacity. 
 (14.1) 
 Clientelism Index 
EMB Capacity (IV) -0.063** 
 (0.028) 
Liberal Component -0.061 
 (0.088) 
GDP per capita Log -0.038** 
 (0.016) 
GDP growth 0.038*** 
 (0.009) 
Constant 0.857*** 
 (0.161) 
R2-within 0.321 
R2-between 0.568 
R2-overall 0.537 
Countries 163 
Observations 12 124 
Note: Regression run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. EMB Capacity instrumented with regional 
average of EMB Capacity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 15. IV Years Since Census. 
 (15.1) 
Clientelism Index 
(15.2) 
Clientelism Index 
EMB capacity (IV) -0.293 -0.052 
 (0.200) (0.067) 
Liberal Component 0.359 -0.078 
 (0.361) (0.158) 
GDP per capita Lag 0.065 -0.025 
 (0.072) (0.028) 
GDP growth 0.113** 0.057*** 
 (0.047) (0.017) 
Constant -0.139 0.757*** 
 (0.706) (0.287) 
R2-within . 0.203 
R2-between 0.452 0.622 
R2-overall 0.395 0.554 
Countries 159 161 
Observations 7 768 8 947 
Note: Regression run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. EMB Capacity instrumented with number of 
years since last census (model 1) and years since last census or since independence (model 2). * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 16. IV Proportion of years with EMB Capacity. 
 
(16.1) 
Clientelism Index 
(16.2) 
Clientelism Index 
(16.3) 
Clientelism Index 
EMB capacity (IV) -0.024 -0.016 -0.010 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.080) 
Liberal Component  -0.147* -0.167 -0.184 
 (0.080) (0.112) (0.178) 
GDP per capita Lag -0.060*** -0.064** -0.065 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.044) 
GDP growth 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant 1.079*** 1.116*** 1.138*** 
 (0.181) (0.269) (0.436) 
R2-within 0.307 0.293 0.278 
R2-between 0.466 0.434 0.418 
R2-overall 0.491 0.473 0.460 
Countries 163.000 163.000 163.000 
Observations 12069.000 11834.000 11511.000 
Note: Regression run with robust standard errors and fixed effects. EMB Capacity instrumented with 
proportion of years with EMB Capacity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A13. Tests Instrumental Variable 
 
Regional 
Average Years Since Census 
Proportion of Years With EMB 
Capacity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
F-Test 81.00 30.64 43.25 69.91 69.38 67.15 
AR 334.52 120.02 6.53 0.02 1.19 0.35 
Wald 9.60 2.14 0.60 0.00 0.12 0.04 
 
